In this paper we analyse why French companies issue units when they raise additional capital. We find that over the last decade nearly a quarter of companies had units seasoned equity offerings. We show that the vast majority of companies that offer the units are from the secondary or New market, the two markets for smaller companies. Our results also show that companies issues units when they have public offers but also when they have rights issues. In addition we find that firms chose unit offerings when there is a risk that the issue will not succeed and when the probability of the use of the proceeds is high. The results suggest that companies issue units to overcome the costs of normal public offerings.
Introduction
Over the last few years a large number of French companies are coming to the market to raise equity in the form of unit offerings. These unit issues consist of bundles of common stock and warrants, sold together as a package. In the aftermarket the stocks and warrants are traded separately. Unlike in the US where units are often associated with initial public offerings (IPOs) and the warrants are callable, in France they are only associated with seasoned equity offerings, 1 the warrants are not callable, and the conversion cannot be forced. The issue of units is controversial. By offering units, firms precommit to a seasoned offering at the exercise price of the warrants, thus giving the subscriber the right to buy further shares at the exercise price within a defined time period. In addition, units issuing provide equity financing in stages, and may, under certain conditions, allow the firm to raise higher proceeds. However, the warrants complicate the offering and may lead to higher flotation expenses and adjustments.
ii In addition, the firm loses control of the choice of the issue price and the timing of the second equity offering, resulting from the exercise of the warrants. Why then do firms choose units seasoned offerings rather than a typical common stock offering?
In a full information setting, units provide no special advantage to the issuers.
However, previous studies provide a number of potential explanations of why companies have unit offerings. These studies are predominantly US, thus relate to initial rather than secondary offerings. However, a number of these explanations apply to the case of seasoned equity offerings. Schultz, 1993 argues that argues that units' offerings bring sequential financing and may therefore reduce agency costs resulting from potential free cash flow. He finds that the probability of a unit offering decreases with the proceeds of the offering, the ratio of assets to proceeds, the age of the firm, the ratio income to proceeds, and the ratio sales to assets. The probability increases with the percentage of equity sold, with the aftermarket variance, and if low prestige underwriters are used. Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997 develop a model in which unit offerings are used as a signal of issuers' confidence in their future performance because the second stage financing is conditional on stock price appreciation. The investment banking community provides an alternative hypothesis by suggesting that warrants are an incentive to raise interest in new offerings. When issuers obtain indications of low demand for the offering, they may prefer to attach warrants rather than to lower the offer price. Thus, warrants included in offerings could be referred to as sweeteners used to increase the rate of subscription in which there is a lack of interest. In this case unit offerings are used to increase the probability of success of a seasoned offering.
The purpose of this paper is to determine the reasons for issuing units under different institutional framework. We test the hypotheses that unit offerings are determined by the agency cost, signaling and arbitrage offer price/banking fees. We also analyse the stock price reaction on the announcement date to show whether units convey less negative information than conventional seasoned equity offering. According to Yeoman (2001) the issuer maximizes the net proceeds of the offering, which depend on the offer price and the underwriter spread 2 . Some firms may prefer lower the offer price and support a reduced spread. If the inclusion of warrants in seasoned equity offerings is used to reduce to reduce the spread, then we would expect the use of this strategy to be dependent on the method of equity offering. In France rights issues are the main flotation method. However, unit seasoned offerings are more likely to come with public offers. This dependence between the choice of the public offering method and the units may result from a specific French regulation constraint. In most cases, the shares are first offered to current shareholders in public offerings, on a pro-rata basis, but this priority cannot be sold like a right. Further, there is a regulation constraint on the issue price: it cannot be less than the average price of ten following daily stock prices chosen among the twenty daily prices before the issue. This regulation constraint, associated with the priority delay of the subscribing period, makes the public offering method risky for the underwriters. In the case of units' offerings, the regulation constraint on the offering price is less effective since there is not a unique valuation of the warrants: their value depends on volatility estimation. In some cases, issuers may choose units to reduce the risk of the public offering method. They prefer to lower the offer price, and to pay lower underwriting fees, when the issue is risky, either because the firm is intrinsically risky, or because the actual shareholders do not want to subscribe to the new shares.
We use a sample of 370 offerings over the period 1986 to 2000. We find that 23.2%
of these offerings include warrants. The unit offerings are more pronounced in the case of public offers (61%) compared to rights offerings (8%). We find that companies that issue units are not more likely to be larger than companies that have conventional seasoned equity offerings, but they appear to have higher underwriting costs, and legal and administrative costs. When we analyse the flotation costs we find that the use of units in public offerings is negative and significant suggesting that warrants decrease flotation costs. This implies that the use of warrants reduce the risk incurred by the underwriters.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional framework and
presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. In Section 4, we present our empirical results on the reason why units are chosen; we give evidence on flotation costs and stock price reaction on the equity announcement dates.
Summary and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Institutional framework and hypotheses tested

Institutional framework:
French firms quite frequently issue units, which include both shares of common stock and warrants, which are traded separately thereafter. In every case, the seasoned offering (unit or common stock) has to be approved at the general shareholder meeting.
French law grants the shareholders a right to purchase new shares, but the general shareholder meeting may waive this pre-emptive right. The approval of the issue may be given for a maximum amount to be raised within five years (rights), three years (without rights), 26 months (type of security and flotation method not specified). Pre-emptive rights cannot be permanently waived by means of charter amendment.
Throughout the paper, we refer to issues without rights as public offerings. The
French institutional setting for public offerings differs from U.S. setting in three ways.
First, in most cases, shares are first offered to current shareholders, on a pro-rata basis, for ten days on average, but this priority cannot be traded like a right 3 . Second, there is a regulation constraint on the issue price: it cannot be less than the average price of ten consecutive daily stock prices chosen among the twenty daily prices before the issue.
Third, public offerings are generally underwritten through a standby-underwriting contract.
In the French public offerings, the offer price and the size of the issue are set at the latest on the COB 4 date, which is on average four days before the beginning of the issue period. The underwriter incurs the risk of adverse changes in share prices from the COB date to the end of the priority period. In the U.S. firm commitments, the offer price is set just prior to the beginning of the issuance and the issuance period is very short. The
French constraints on the issue price increase the risk for the underwriters, who will only accept to enter a public offering if they assess that the true value of the stock is higher than the offer price. The existence of a priority period for current shareholders emphasises the underwriter's risk, by postponing the end of the issue period. As a result, underwriter certification associated with French public offerings may be stronger than in the U.S. firm commitments.
Hypotheses tested
In this section we review the literature and set up our hypotheses. Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses tested in the previous literature.
Signaling hypothesis
In an environment of information asymmetry, firm insiders have private information about the mean of their future cash flows. They know if the firm is a good firm (high expected future cash-flow) or a bad firm (low expected future cash-flow), while outsiders cannot identify the type of the firm. When any firm raises capital in an IPO or a seasoned offering, outsiders cannot distinguish between the two types of firm, either bad or good. In this setting, the firms of the good type have a great interest in signaling their quality. In the seminal paper of Leland and Pyle (1977) , the risk-averse insiders of the good firm choose to signal their quality by retaining a large fraction of the equity issued. Their model is developed in the case of a one-shot equity offering.
The signaling characteristics of a two stage financing have been mainly underlined in the case of IPOs. In that case, high-quality firms underprice at the IPO in order to obtain a higher price at a subsequent seasoned offering (see for instance Allen and Faulhaber, 1989 , Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989 , Welch, 1996 or Chemmanur, 1993 . Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) develop a theory of unit IPOs based on asymmetric information. Their model allows for the firms to differ in both the mean and the riskiness of future cash-flows. At time 0, the firm insiders know the true mean and the variance of the future cash-flows, but they do not know the exact value which will occur at time 1. In this setting, the good-type firm may use three types of signal that will deter mimicking by the bad-type firm: the fraction of equity retained, the degree of underpricing and the number of warrants. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) show that there exists a separating equilibrium, in which high-risk firms issue underpriced units, and lower risk firms issue underpriced common stock alone. Their model provides several testable predictions. First, unit IPOs should be associated with greater ex post variance compared with common stock IPOs. Second, for firms that have made unit IPOs, the fraction of firm value sold as warrants will be increasing in firm riskiness.
Third, in unit IPOs, the percent of underpricing will be decreasing in firm riskiness.
Fourth, in unit IPOs, the fraction of equity retained by insiders will be decreasing in firm riskiness.
These predictions may also be valuable for seasoned equity issues. Chemmanur and Fulghieri suggest that the impact of asymmetric information should be expected to be less severe for seasoned equity issues than for IPOs, and therefore the modeled phenomena less pronounced.
Agency costs hypothesis
If equity is issued in order to finance an investment with a positive net present value, firms do not need units. But, if the outsiders cannot determine the value of the potential investments, they may be reluctant to subscribe to an equity offering, because there exits a risk of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) . According to the free cash-flow problem, managers have an incentive to invest in negative present value projects in order to keep their own jobs. It is all the more important as the monitoring of the firm is reduced, for example, when there is a more dispersed pattern of ownership. In this situation, multi-stage equity financing bonds the managers to undertake optimal projects.
Consequently, unit issues reduce the agency costs of free cash flow by providing equity financing in two stages, just like venture-capital firms provide financing in a sequence of infusions (see Sahlman, 1990) . The second financing is conditional on stock price appreciation. Management has to prove that the firm has worthwhile projects to obtain the second round financing. Thus, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that firms will issue units if there is a doubt on the quality of their investments and on their growth opportunities. It also suggests that unit IPOs will be issued by smaller, younger and riskier firms than common stock IPOs.
Net proceeds maximization hypothesis
Yeoman (2001) develops a theory that explains how the spread and the offering price are determined in the case of an underwritten offering. In the model, an issuer seeks to maximize the net proceeds of the offering, that is the difference between the offering price and the issuing fees. The fees are proportional to the offering price and represent the spread between the offering price and the net proceeds. The underwriter operates in a competitive environment that requires that the revenues (underwriting fees) of an offering equal its expected costs. By maximizing the issuer's net proceeds under the underwriter's constraint, Yeoman determines sequentially the optimal spread and the offering price in the case of seasoned equity offerings. In that case, if the initial return is positive, investors may have an incentive to short sell the shares before the offering. Consequently, the net proceeds are maximized by reducing the incentive to short sell and this is accomplished by limiting the expected initial return.
The model leads to several predictions. The optimal offer price and the net proceeds are a decreasing function of price uncertainty and an increasing function of the underwriting fee. The expected initial return is an increasing function of price uncertainty and a decreasing function of the new share ratio and the underwriting fee.
These results are established for seasoned equity offerings or unseasoned offerings when there is no possibility of short selling.
Under French rules, in a common stock public offering, the offer price has to be equal to the market value (average of 10 among 20 prices). This may not be optimal, as the simulations of Yeoman show. French firms may find some flexibility in issuing packages of shares and warrants. As the valuation of warrants may not be unique, the offer price of the package may be less than the sum of the market values of both securities. Chollet and Ginglinger (2001) show that the French public offering units are on average underpriced by 10%. Some risky firms may prefer to lower the offer price of the units than pay for increased underwriting fees. Further, there is no problem of shortselling as the warrant, and not the share, is underpriced. The situation is then comparable to IPOs where there is no short selling possible because the shares are not listed. Lee et al (2000) show that the underwriting fees and the other fees do not differ for unit IPOs compared to shares only IPOs. The results on our sample are very similar:
units SEOs fees are not higher than shares only offering fees, when controlling for the blockholders' subscription rate. But as the unit issuers are on average riskier, we would expect higher underwriting fees. This could suggest that some firms prefer to lower the offer price of the offering, and to incur lower underwriting fees.
Data and methodology
We identify all equity issues taking place on the French market through the annual These criteria produce a sample of 370 offerings described in table 1, of which 71% are rights issues and 29% are public offerings. In France, most seasoned equity issues, whether rights or not, are underwritten. Table 3 The average size of the equity rights offerings is 86 million € and the average size of public offerings is 112.45 million €. On average, the subscription price is 90% of the prevailing stock price (79% for rights issues and 115% for public offerings). French firms are required to fix the rights subscription price at the agreement date, which is on average 10 days before the beginning of the subscription period. This period lasts on average 15 days. The subscription price in public offerings is disclosed nearer to the beginning of the issue (on average 4 days before), and the subscription period is shorter (8 days long on average). This relatively long period explains why the issuer and the underwriter have to anticipate secondary market prices when determining the offer price. The average number of shares offered, as a percentage of the outstanding and new shares, is 22 % (24 % for rights issues and 15 % for public offerings). It is interesting to note that the choice of a flotation method varies from country to country according to the firm size. For instance, in the U.K., according to Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) , firms that choose placings are very small relative to rights issuers. In the U.S., the uninsured rights issuers are small firms, but no significant difference in sizes appears between standby rights issuers and firm commitments issuers (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) . In France, large firms prefer public offers to standby rights, which, in turn, are preferred to uninsured rights.
Empirical results
In this section we present the results of the various tests we obtained using the 370 French seasoned equity offerings over the period 1986-2000. Table 4 presents the cross-sectional regressions of flotation costs on the use of warrants in seasoned equity offering. The results indicate that for public offerings, as for rights offerings, the fees (underwriting fees and total fees) decrease with the issuing size, but increase with the percent of the issue which is guaranteed, with the percent subscribed by the outsiders and asymmetric information.
Issuing costs of seasoned offerings
If we consider public offerings, the fees are higher for common stock issues compared to unit issues, all else being equal. An issue of shares is more expensive in terms of underwriting fees, about 0.6%. This amount is to be compared with the undervaluation in the case of unit issues. Undervaluation is about 16%, which makes unit issues far more expensive.
If we consider rights offerings, the systematic risk of the firm plays a determinant role in explaining the magnitude of the fees (underwriting and total). The risk of the firm increases the amount of fees.
The results, reported in Table 5 , indicate that underpricing increases significantly with the participation of the outsiders and asymmetric information. Guarantee reduces the size of underpricing, due to a higher probability of success, but not significantly.
In the case of a seasoned offering, the firm faces three types of cost: fees (underwriting and legal fees), underpricing and the reaction following the announcement of the offering. In the next paragraph, stock price reaction to seasoned offerings is being studied by distinguishing unit offerings and common stock offerings.
Stock price reaction to Seasoned equity offerings in France
A standard event-study is performed in order to measure the impact on prices of a seasoned equity offering announcement. Define day 0 as the announcement date. The purpose is to test if mean excess returns are significantly different from 0 around the relative day of announcement. If R it designates the observed logarithmic return for security i and R mt the index return at date t 6 , The excess return can be calculated by the difference between R it and a reference N it , which corresponds to a normal return in the absence of any event. Three reference returns can be defined: the index return, the mean return measured over an estimation period before the event period and the market adjusted return. The parameters 7 are estimated over a period between 220 days and 21 days before the day of announcement ( ) t = 0 . The cross-sectional mean excess return (1)
The second statistic (2) is obtained by dividing the mean excess return by a crosssectional standard estimation. Table 6 reports the results. In the case of public offerings, the announcement of unit issues seems to lead to a more negative reaction than the announcement of common stock issues, which compensates for the difference in underwriting fees observed for both unit and common stock issues. The banking fees are lower in the case of unit issues, but this is offset by the size of underpricing and the magnitude of stock market reaction following the issue. In the case of rights issues, common stock offerings lead to a significant negative reaction, whereas unit issues are not followed by a significant reaction.
A cross-sectional analysis is completed in order to explain the magnitude of mean abnormal returns. This analysis makes it possible to observe differences between common stock issues and unit issues around the date of announcement. The results are reported in Table 7 . The dependant variable is the two-day excess return at announcement of equity offerings. Several continuous and qualitative variables are included in our analysis.
The continuous variables are defined by the size of the offering (GP), the volatility (Volat). The qualitative variable included in the model is defined by a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the offering is a unit issue (Unit).
Even if it is not significant when we control for other variables, stock market reaction to the announcement of a unit issue is more negative compared to the announcement of a common stock issue, in the case of public offerings.
Even if banking fees are higher for common stock issues, the difference between these fees seems to be compensated by a more negative reaction in the case of a unit issue.
The likelihood of issuing units
The choice of issuing packaged securities may be explained by several characteristics of the issue. The underwriters seem to induce firms to choose to issue units instead of one-shot equity when there exists a probability of lack of interest in the issue.
Consequently, when the old shareholders do not intend to subscribe to the issue or when there is an international part, the probability of choosing unit issues is higher.
If the firm makes an issue in order to invest in a defined project or to make an acquisition, the managers will choose to issue units with a higher probability, because of the risk of failure of the project. A multi-stage financing is appropriate, because the firm is not sure to invest in projects with a positive net present value. Moreover, this lowers the problem of free cash-flow.
Summary and conclusions
The purpose of the paper is to test the various hypotheses developed in the case of units IPOs to the French unit seasoned equity offerings. The French institutional framework allows us to do so as companies can include warrants in their seasoned equity offierings.
We test the hypotheses using a sample of 370 equity offerings in France over the 1986 to 2000 period. We find that the costs of issuing units are higher, especially for public offerings. The gains in underwriting fees are largely offset by the extent of underpricing due to the valuation of warrants and the magnitude of stock market reaction.
Firms tend to choose unit issues, when there is a risk of lack of interest in the offering, or when there is a probability of mis-use of the funds (problem of free cashflow). (Schultz, 1993 , Jain, 1994 , How and Howe, 2001 , Lee, Lee and Taylor, 2000 Riskier
Proceeds
Lower proceeds Lower Sales/Proceeds Lower Assets/Proceeds Higher percentage of equity sold
The proportion of the firm sold as warrant increases with firm riskiness (Lee et al., 2000) Fraction of equity retained by insiders
Lower
Decreases with riskiness
Rate of failure Higher Increases with offer size, fim age, underwriter prestige (Schultz, 1993 , not confirmed by Jain when controlling for other caracteristics). Underpricing More underpriced, all else being equal (yes Schultz, no How and Howe, Lee and al) Underpricing increases with firm riskiness
Underpricing increases with firm riskiness, decreases with the new share ration, and underwriting fees Underwriter Lower quality (Lee at al., 2000) Underwriting fees Higher a. The ratio subscription price over common stock price is measured by using the price of the stock just before the first date of the announcement of the issue.
b. The market value of equity is measured by multiplying the stock price just before the announcement of the issue by the number of shares available at this date.
c. This table presents the cross-sectional regression model to explain the extent of undervaluation especially in function of the banking fees. Ext is the percent of the issue non taken-up by blockholders. Ai designates firm specific risk. Gar is the underwritten percentage of the offer. Ufees designates the underwriting fees. Volat represents the variance of the stock calculated before the announcement of the issue. The least squares regression model is developed, using hypothesis tests based on consistent estimates of covariance matrices allowing for heteroskedasticity, as in White (1980) . *, **, *** denote significance of the test at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively: t-statistics are in brackets. Note: This table presents the logistic regression of issuing units in function of explaining factors. The explaining variables are the percent guaranteed by the old shareholders (Gar), the relative variation of known shareholders before and after the issue (Des). There are also dummy variables: 1 if the firm issues just after an IPO, 1 if the issue takes place during the period between 15/09/1999 and 01/04/2000 (Period), 1 if there is an international part (Inter), 1 if the objective of the issue is to invest in a project or to acquire another firm (Object), 1 if the firm belongs to a group. *, **, *** denote significance of the test at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively: degrees of significance are in brackets.
i Unit issues are complex instruments and an example will help illustrate the main institutional characteristics. Lafarge Coppée made a typical unit offering in September 1993. For 434FF, investors received a unit of one share and one warrant. Two warrants allowed the purchase of one share at an exercise price of 460FF at any time until April 1, 1996. The exercise price is adjusted for events such as rights issues, stock splits or stock dividends. ii Units are complex instruments and an example will help to illustrate the main institutional characteristics. Lafarge Coppée made a typical unit offering in September 1993. For 66.16 €, the investors received a unit of one share and one warrant. Two warrants allowed the purchase of one share at an exercise price of 70.13 € at any time until April 1, 1996. The exercise price is adjusted for events such as rights issues, stock splits or stock dividends.
